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Bankruptcy
by Hon. John T. Laney,

I*

and Daniel Taylor**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article offers a review of recent bankruptcy-related opinions
issued in 2014 by the United States Supreme Court and courts within
the Eleventh Circuit.' The topics are varied, ranging from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts to the ever-developing law arising from
"lien stripping."
II.

BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION

In Executive Benefits InsuranceAgency v. Arkison, the United States
Supreme Court clarified an issue that arose in the aftermath of its
decision in Stern v. Marshall3-how a bankruptcy court should proceed
when a "Stern claim" is identified.4 The Court concluded that when
faced with deciding a Stern claim the bankruptcy court may issue
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1. For an analysis of bankruptcy law during the prior survey period, see Hon. John T.
Laney, III & Daniel Taylor, Bankruptcy, Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 65 MERCER L. Rsv. 869
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2. 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
3. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
4. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2173. A "Stern claim" is a "core claim" on which the
Constitution does not permit a bankruptcy court to enter final judgment. Id. at 2172-73.
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proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by
the district court. 5
The Court's decision in Arkison expanded on its decision in Stern.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1576 a bankruptcy court may enter final judgment on
a claim in two circumstances-in "core" proceedings,7 and in "non-core "s
proceedings "with the consent of all the parties."9 In Stern, the Court
held that even though a bankruptcy court was statutorily permitted to
enter final judgment on core claims, Article III of the Constitution"0
prohibits bankruptcy judges from entering final orders on certain claims
that qualify as core.11 At issue in Stern was whether a bankruptcy
court could issue a final order on a common law counterclaim brought
by the bankruptcy estate against a person filing a claim against the
estate.12 The Court held that even though 28 U.S.C. § 157(bX2)
designated such counter claims as core proceedings within the bankruptcy court's power to adjudicate, such claims were actually non-core claims
required to be adjudicated by an Article III judge."3 Simply put, Stern
made clear that some claims labeled as core by Congress may not be
court even though expressly authorized in
adjudicated by a bankruptcy
14
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2).
However, the Court in Stern did not decide how a bankruptcy or
district court should proceed when faced with a Stern claim. 5 That
was precisely the issue before the Court in Arkison. In Arkison, the
Chapter 7 trustee brought a fraudulent transfer action against Executive
Benefits, which had purchased certain assets from the debtor prior to the
bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court entered summary judgment in
favor of the trustee. On appeal, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington conducted a de novo review and affirmed
the bankruptcy court decision. While Arkison was on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court
issued its Stern opinion. Executive Benefits argued that in light of the
Stern decision, the bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter summary

5.

Id. at 2173.

6. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
7. Id. § 157(b).
8.
to the
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Non-core claims are those claims which are "not... core" but that otherwise relate
bankruptcy case. Id. § 157(c).
28 U.S.C. § 157(cX2).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Stern, 131 S.Ct at 2620.
Id. at 2600, 2601.
Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2172.
Id.
Id.
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judgment. 6 The Ninth Circuit held that under Stern, a bankruptcy
court was not permitted "to enter final judgment on a fraudulent7
conveyance claim against a noncreditor unless the parties consent."1
The Ninth Circuit went on to find that Executive Benefits had impliedly
consented to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, and therefore affirmed
the decision of the district court. 18
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit, but did so without
addressing the issue of whether parties may consent to bankruptcy court
jurisdiction to determine Stern claims. 9 Instead, the Supreme Court
relied on the severability provision of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 198420 to close the so called "statutory gap"2 '
in § 157 created by the Stern decision. 2 Section 157(b)(1) authorizes
bankruptcy judges to "enter appropriate orders and judgments" on core
claims.2 3 However, § 157(c)(1) provides that a bankruptcy court
determining non-core claims is to "'hear [the] proceeding,' and then
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district
court. ' " 24 This supposedly created a "statutory gap" in § 157, whereby
Stern claims fell under neither § 157(b)(1) nor § 157(c)(1).2 5 The Court
concluded that Stern claims are subject to § 157(cXl), and therefore, a
bankruptcy court may hear Stern claims and submit proposed findings
of fact 2 and conclusions of law to the district court for a de novo
review. 6

16. Id. at 2169.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 2175.
20. Pub. L. No. 79-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). The severability provision provides in
pertinent part, "If any provision of this Act or the application thereof... is held invalid,
the remainder of this Act, or the application of that provision to persons or circumstances
other than those as to which it is held invalid, is not affected thereby." Id. at 344.
21. In Arkison, the petitioners argued that because § 157(b) does not explicitly
authorize bankruptcy judges to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in
"core" proceedings, Stern created a "gap" in the bankruptcy statute whereby bankruptcy
courts had no authority to hear Stern claims, thus requiring all Stern claims to be heard
in district court. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2172-73. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in
Arkison, this argument had some traction among lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit.
See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d
553, 565-66 (2012) (describing the "statutory gap" created by Stern), aff'd, 134 S. Ct. 2165
(2014).
22. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2173.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
24. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2172 (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157(cX1)).
25. See id. at 2173.
26. Id. at 2174.
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In Arkison, the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the
trustee without specifying whether it was acting pursuant to the core or
non-core provisions of § 157. On appeal, the district court did not
address whether there was a Stern problem, but it did conduct a de novo
review of the bankruptcy court decision and issued an opinion affirming
the bankruptcy court. The district court then separately entered
judgment in favor of the trustee.2 7 Thus, according to the Supreme
Court, although the case did not proceed exactly in the fashion outlined
in § 157(c)(1), Executive Benefits received the same treatment it would
have if the case had proceeded in accordance with § 157(c)(1)-a de novo
review by an Article III court.28
III.

EXEMPTIONS

Retirement Funds

A.

The Bankruptcy Code 29 allows an individual debtor to exempt certain
assets from the bankruptcy estate.30 One such asset is "retirement
funds."3 ' In Clark v. Rameker, 2 the Supreme Court was presented
with the issue of whether funds in an inherited individual retirement
account (IRA) qualify within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 522(bX3XC) ,3
as "retirement funds."34 The Court unanimously held that funds held
in an inherited IRA are not retirement funds within the meaning of the
federal exemption statute.35
In Clark, the petitioner, Heidi Heffron-Clark, inherited her mother's
traditional IRA. At that point the traditional IRA was reclassified as an
inherited IRA. Heffron-Clark chose to receive monthly distributions
rather than withdraw the entire balance of the account. In October
2010, Heffron-Clark and her husband filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition and listed the inherited IRA, then having a value of approximately $300,000, on the schedules and claimed its value as exempt
under 11 U.S.C. § 522(bX3)(C). The trustee objected to the claimed

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id. at 2175.
U.S.C. tit. 11 (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 522(bXl)-(3) (2012).
Id. § 522(b)(3XC).
134 S. Ct. 2242 (2014).
11 U.S.C. § 522(bX3Xc) (2012).
Id. at 2244; see also 11 U.S.C. § 522(bX3Xc).
134 S.Ct. at 2244.
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exemption, arguing that the funds in the inherited IRA were not
retirement funds within the meaning of the statute. 36
The bankruptcy court agreed with the trustee and denied the
exemption.37 On appeal, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin reversed, reasoning that the exemption
only covers an account containing funds that were "originally accumulated for retirement purposes." 3 The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding
that an inherited IRA was not within the class of retirement funds
covered by the exemption because it is a fund that is available for
immediate consumption, rather than one designed solely for retirement
purposes.39 The Supreme Court, seeking to resolve a split of authority
between the Seventh Circuit's holding in Clark and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's holding in Chilton v. Moser (In
re Chilton),40 granted certiorari.4 1
The Supreme Court based its holding on the difference between the
Internal Revenue Code's4 2 treatment of an inherited IRA and its
Both traditional and Roth
treatment of a traditional or Roth IRA.4
IRAs offer tax advantages to encourage individuals to save for retirement.4 4 However, both types of accounts are subject to a penalty if
withdrawals are made before an accountholder reaches the age of fiftynine and one half.45 On the other hand, funds within an inherited IRA
may be withdrawn at any time, without penalty, regardless of the
account holder's age.46 Moreover, an inheritor is prohibited from
making contributions to an inherited IRA and "must either withdraw the
entire balance in the account within five years ... or take minimum
distributions on an annual basis. '
The Court held that § 522(b)(3)(C) requires that funds satisfy two
conditions in order to be exempt: (1) the funds must be retirement funds;
and (2) the funds must be held in an account that is exempt from

36. Id. at 2245.
37. Id. at 2246.
38. Id. (quoting Clark v.Rameke (In re Clark), 466 B.R. 135, 139 (W.D. Wisc. 2012))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
39. Id.
40. 674 F.3d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 2012).
41. Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2246.
42. U.S.C. tit. 26 (2012).
43. Clark, 134 S. Ct. at 2244-45.
44. Id. at 2245.
45. Id.
46. Id. If the inheritor is the spouse of the original owner, the spouse will have the
option to "roll over" the IRA funds into the spouse's own IRA, or the spouse may keep the
IRA as an inherited IRA subject to the rules that apply to non-spouse inheritors. Id.
47. Id.
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taxation under one of the listed Internal Revenue Code sections.4"
Since the funds at issue in Clark were not retirement funds, they failed
to satisfy the first element, and therefore, were not exempt under
§ 522(b)(3XC). 49 It is also worth noting that Clark was a case decided
under the federal exemption statute.50 Thus, even though inherited
IRAs are not exempt under the federal exemption statute, they may be
exempt under specific state exemption statutes.8 '
B.

SurchargingExemptions

Under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a)52 a bankruptcy court "may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [the Bankruptcy Code]." In the case of Law v. Siegel,54
the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether § 105(a) gives
a bankruptcy court the authority to surcharge a debtor's exemptions to
cover administrative expenses incurred as a result of the debtor's
misconduct.55 In Siegel, the trustee sought to surcharge the debtor's
exemption in his home to cover attorney fees incurred by the trustee for
litigation that was the result of the debtor's fraudulent conduct.5" The
Court unanimously held that such a surcharge was not permitted under
the Bankruptcy Code.57 In its holding, the Court concluded that even
though § 105(a) grants a bankruptcy court statutory authority to issue
"'any order ... appropriate to carry out the provisions" 8 of the
Bankruptcy Code, such an order "may not contravene express provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code."59
The debtor's misdeeds in Siegel were extraordinary. In 2004 the
debtor, Stephen Law, filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and Alfred
Siegel was appointed trustee. On his schedules the debtor listed the

48. Id. at 2248.
49. Id. at 2247-48.
50. See id. at 2244-45.
51. Georgia has chosen to opt out of the federal exemption scheme but there are
Georgia statute sections that cover retirement funds. See O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(aX2Xf),
(2.1)(D) (2002 & Supp. 2014). The Georgia statute does not specifically address inherited
individual IRAs, but some states have chosen to specifically list them. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 222.21(2Xa) (West 1998 & Supp. 2015) (specifically allowing an exemption for inherited
IRAs).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2012).
53.

Id.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014).
Id. at 1192.
Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1192, 1194-95.
Id. at 1198 (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9011(cX2)).

59.

Id.
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value of his home as $363,348 and claimed $75,000 as exempt under
California's homestead exemption.
He listed the home as being
encumbered by two liens: (1) a note and deed of trust for $147,156.52 in
favor of Washington Mutual Bank; and (2) a second note and deed of
trust for $156,929.04 in favor of "Lin's Mortgage & Associates." Thus,
according to the debtor's schedules there was no equity in the house
because the value of the two liens exceeded the non-exempt value of the
house. Therefore, if the schedules were accurate the debtor would have
presumably been able to keep his house because there would not be a
reason for the trustee to pursue a sale since there would be nothing to
distribute to his other creditors. However, the debtor's schedules were
not accurate. 0
A few months after the petition was filed, the trustee brought an
adversary proceeding alleging that the lien in favor of Lin's Mortgage &
Associates was fraudulent. The deed supporting the lien listed a debt
to someone named "Lili Lin." Eventually, two people claiming to be Lili
Lin responded to the trustee's complaint. One, Lili Lin of Artesia,
California, admitted she was a former acquaintance of the debtor, but
denied that she had ever loaned the debtor any money. The second Lili
Lin-a supposed resident of China who spoke no English-came forward
and managed to engage in extensive litigation over the next five years
contesting the avoidance of the lien and subsequent sale of the house.61
Eventually, in 2009, the bankruptcy court found that no person named
Lili Lin had ever loaned the debtor money in exchange for the disputed
deed of trust, and that the loan was a fiction created by the debtor in an
attempt to preserve the debtor's equity in his house. Acting pursuant to
its authority under § 105(a), the court granted the trustee's motion to
"surcharge" the debtor's entire homestead exemption, thereby making
those funds available to offset the trustee's excess of $500,000 in legal
fees. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed.6" The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
which found that the surcharge was proper because it was designed to
compensate the estate for the cost of the litigation and warranted to
protect the bankruptcy process.6 3
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court noted that § 105(a) does
not allow the bankruptcy court to issue orders that contradict specific
sections of the Bankruptcy Code. 4 The Court stated that even though

60. Id. at 1193.
61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 1194.
64. Id. at 1194-95.
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§ 105(a) grants the bankruptcy court authority to carry out provisions
of the Code, it may not do so by taking action that is specifically
prohibited elsewhere in the Code.6" Thus, the Court concluded that the
bankruptcy court's surcharge was unauthorized because it directly
contravened 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3XA),66 which allowed the debtor to
exempt $75,000 of equity in his home, and 11 U.S.C. § 522(k), which
made the exempted property unavailable "'for payment of any administrative expense."'6 8 The Court explained that even though the exemption statute specifically lists acts that would permit denying the
exemption, it does not allow denying the exemption based on the specific
fraud committed in this case. 69 Thus, the surcharge was not permitted
under the Bankruptcy Code.7 °
C.

Health Savings Accounts

Section 522(b) permits a state to opt out of the Bankruptcy Code's
exemption statute and limit debtors to those exemptions specifically
listed in the state's exemption statute.7" Georgia has chosen to opt out,
and for debtors residing in Georgia, section 44-13-100(a) of the Official
Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.) 72 contains the applicable exemptions. 73 In
the case of In re Mooney,74 the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Georgia determined whether a debtor may exempt funds in
a health savings account (HSA) from her bankruptcy estate. 75 HSAs
were created as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003,76 and "provide a tax-advantaged vehicle
for payment of medical expenses by individuals with high-deductible
health insurance plans."77 Specifically, the court was asked to decide
whether a HSA qualified as a payment on "account of illness" within the

65. Id. at 1194.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 522(bX3XA) (2012).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 522(k) (2012).
68. Law, 134 S. Ct. at 1195 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 522(k)).
69. Id. at 1196.
70. Id. Although the trustee did not object to the debtor's exemption, it appears the
Supreme Court would have reached the same result even if the trustee had timely objected.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b).
72. O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a).
73. Id.
74. 503 B.R. 916 (2014).
75. Id. at 918.
76. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
77. In re Mooney, 503 B.R. at 918.
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scope of O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(aX2XC) and (E), which allows a debtor to
exempt such payments.78
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition on June 27, 2013. On Schedule
B, the debtor listed a HSA valued at $17,570.93. On Schedule C, she
claimed the full value of the HSA as exempt, and the Trustee objected.79 The debtor argued that her HSA was exemptible under O.C.G.A.
§ 44-13-100(a)(2XC) and (E), which provide an exemption for a debtor's
°
or "[a]
right to "[a] disability, illness, or unemployment benefit,'
payment under a pension, annuity, or similar plan or contract on
account of illness .... ."' According to the debtor, Congress intended
to create a health and illness benefit when it authorized HSAs such that
HSAs fell within the ordinary meaning of the term "illness benefit."
The court disagreed, and concluded that "[blecause the HSA is not a
substitute for wages, it is not the type of illness benefit or right to
receive payment on account of illness contemplated by O.C.G.A. § 44-13100(aX2XC) and (E)."83
The court reasoned that "[biased on the ordinary definitions of illness
and benefit, an HSA can be described as a benefit in that it is a 'useful
aid' or 'advantage' for saving for medical expenses. However, that
'
benefit or right to payment is not limited to 'unhealthy conditions."'
The court noted that "[qlualified medical expenses include expenses 'for
the the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body.'"'
In addition, the court explained that the Georgia Supreme Court's
decision in Silliman v. Cassell,8" established a narrow definition of
payments on account of illness and illness benefits, which required such
7
payments to be a "substitute[] for wages" in order to be exempt.
Accordingly, since there was nothing about the debtor's HSA to suggest
it was intended as a substitute for wages, the court concluded that it
was not the type of illness benefit or right to receive payment exemptible
under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2XC) and § 44-13-100(aX2XE).8

78. Id. at 918-19.
79. Id. at 917.
80. Id. at 918 (quoting O.C.GA. § 44-13-100(a)(2XC)).

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. (quoting O.C.G.A § 44-13-100(aX2)(E)).
Id. at 918-19.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 919.
Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 213(d)(1XA) (2012)).
292 Ga. 464, 738 S.E.2d 606 (2013).
In re Mooney, 503 B.R. at 919 (quoting Cassell, 292 Ga. at 468, 738 S.E.2d at
Id. at 922.

.).
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PROFESSIONALS

Having attorney fees paid through a Chapter 13 plan is a common
occurrence in bankruptcy practice.89 However, in the Eleventh Circuit,
filing an "attorney-fee-centric" plan may result in a denial of confirmation.9" In Brown v. Gore (In re Brown),9 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Alabama denying confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
that was designed primarily to finance the payment of the debtor's
attorney fees.92 The bankruptcy court found that the debtor filed his
Chapter 13 case for the sole purpose of paying his attorney in installments and thus failed to satisfy 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) 9' and 11 U.S.C.
94 which both require that a bankruptcy petition is filed in
§ 1325(a)(7),
95
good faith.
The facts of In re Brown are simple. The debtor, Lerin Brown, filed
a Chapter 13 petition and his schedules showed he had a total monthly
income of $1364, and total monthly expenses of $1214. This left him
with monthly net discretionary income of $150. Brown's schedules listed
no real property and no non-exempt personal property, not even a
vehicle. Brown's schedules listed a total of $16,203 owed to ten different
creditors, all of which held unsecured, nonpriority claims. Brown
proposed a thirty-six month long plan, which called for monthly
payments of $150, for a total of $5400. From this total Brown would
pay: (1) $2000 in attorney fees; (2) $281 court filing fee; (3) $50 for credit
counseling; (4) $20 for a credit report; and (5) 4.5 percent of each $150
payment as the Chapter 13 trustee's commission. Accordingly, the plan
proposed to pay $2806 to unsecured creditors, or approximately
seventeen percent of the total unsecured debt.9" The plan also "proposed to pay all attorney's fees and administrative expenses before any
distributions to" unsecured creditors. 9 Thus, the creditors would have
to wait almost seventeen months before receiving their first payment.
Only three creditors, totaling $1,355.08, ended up filing claims.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

See, e.g., Brown v. Gore (In re Brown), 742 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 2014).
See id. at 1314-15.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1314-15.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX3) (2012).
11 U.S.C. § 1325(aX7) (2012).
See id. § 1325(aX3).
In re Brown, 742 F.3d at 1310, 1311.
Id. at 1311.

20151

BANKRUPTCY

891

Therefore, Brown's plan would pay more in attorney fees than it would
to unsecured creditors. 98
The trustee objected to confirmation on the grounds that the plan was
not proposed in good faith and that it did not appear that the debtor
would be able to comply with the plan. At the confirmation hearing, the
bankruptcy court determined that the only reason Brown filed a Chapter
13 case, instead of a Chapter 7 case, was so that he could pay his
attorney fees in installments through a Chapter 13 plan. In light of that
finding, the bankruptcy court concluded that the petition and plan had
not been proposed in good faith. Accordingly, the bankruptcy court orally
dismissed the case."
Following the oral dismissal the bankruptcy court entered a written
order, wherein it went into great detail explaining its decision to dismiss
for lack of good faith.'00 In its order, the bankruptcy court analyzed
the proposed plan against the factors outlined in In re Kitchens'01 for
determining good faith.'0 2 The Eleventh Circuit determined that the
bankruptcy court did not clearly err in its determination that the
debtor's motivation in seeking Chapter 13 relief was not to preserve
assets and adjust debts, but was to finance his attorney fees. 0 3 The
court noted that the debtor was the ideal candidate for Chapter 7, in
that he had no non-exempt assets and no vehicle or home to preThe court found that the debtor's plan was all about paying
serve.'
05
attorney fees and was not in his own best interest or the creditors'.'
The court went on to explain that had the bankruptcy court affirmed the
plan, there would have been nothing preventing the debtor from paying
his first seventeen payments, thereby paying his attorney in full and
then converting his case to a Chapter 7.1°6 Such a scenario would
allow the debtor to circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Lamie v.
United States Trustee,107 that attorney fees cannot be paid out of estate
funds in a Chapter 7 case unless the attorney is engaged by the trustee
with court approval. 08

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

id.
Id. at 1311, 1312-13.
Id. at 1313.
702 F.2d 885 (11th Cir. 1983).
In re Brown, 742 F.3d at 1313.
Id. at 1317-18.
Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1318.

106. Id.
107. 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
108. In re Brown, 742 F.3d at 1318.
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Although the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's
dismissal, it was careful to explain that its holding applied to the facts
before it and that it was making no opinion as to other attorney-feecentric Chapter 13 plans. °9 In doing so the Court stated, "There is no
hard and fast rule to be applied. Each case has its own special circumstances, and Chapter 13 requires a case-by-case analysis by the factfinder."110 So, while the attorney-fee-centric plan was not filed in good
faith in In re Brown that does not mean an attorney-fee-centric case will
not be allowed under different circumstances."'
V.

BANKRUPTCY APPEALS

In the case of Atkinson v. Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. (In re Ernie Haire
Ford, Inc.),"2 the Eleventh Circuit was faced with an issue of first
impression-whether the "person aggrieved" standard for appealing a
bankruptcy court order is satisfied when the sole interest allegedly
harmed by that order is the interest in avoiding liability from an
adversary proceeding." 3 The court held such an interest does not
satisfy the person aggrieved standard."4 In doing so the court also
adopted the rule followed in many other circuits: for a person to be
sufficiently "aggrieved," the interest that person seeks to defend on
appeal must be one that is protected by the Bankruptcy Code." 5
In In re ErnieHaireFord,Inc., the debtor's confirmed Chapter 11 plan
called for, among other things, a liquidating agent who was empowered
to sue third parties on behalf of the estate. The plan also called for a
litigation bar date, after which the plan provided that the court may
enjoin pursuit of any claim barred by the plan. In 2011, well after the
litigation bar date, the liquidating agent brought an adversary proceeding against the defendant, Benjamin Atkinson, a former employee of the
debtor. Atkinson moved to enjoin the agent from the proceeding
pursuant to the terms of the plan. In response, the debtor filed a motion
to modify the plan to allow for litigation against Atkinson. 6 The
bankruptcy court granted the motion to modify because it found that the
plan had not been substantially consummated as "the Debtor still

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
similar
116.

Id. at 1319.
Id.
See id.
764 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1325-26.
Id.
Id. at 1326 (noting that the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have each issued
rulings).
Id. at 1323-24.
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controlled a number of assets ... that were required to be sold under the
[plan]. "117 On appeal, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court's decision.'18
The Eleventh Circuit had previously adopted the person aggrieved
standard for bankruptcy appeals, which limits the right to appeal a
bankruptcy court order to only "'those parties having a direct and
substantial interest in the question being appealed.'"" 9 An aggrieved
person is one that is "'directly, adversely, and peculiarly affect[edl' by a
bankruptcy court's order."2 ' Such is the case when the bankruptcy
court's order "diminishes their property, increases their burdens, or
impairs their rights."' 2 ' In In re Ernie Haire Ford,Inc., the court held
"that a party is not aggrieved, for the purposes of appealing from a
bankruptcy court order, when the only interest allegedly harmed by that
order is the interest in avoiding liability from an adversary proceeding." 12 2 The court explained that orders allowing litigation to go
forward do not burden a party's ability to defend against liability, but
merely require parties to exercise that ability.1" Thus, such an order
does not diminish property or burden a party's rights.2
The court went on to hold that for a person to be aggrieved, the
interest sought to be vindicated on appeal must be one that is protected
or regulated by the Bankruptcy Code. 1" Atkinson argued that he met
this standard because he had suffered a direct harm in that the
bankruptcy court's order deprived him of a defense to the litigation-the
litigation bar date. 6 The court was unpersuaded and explained that
even if Atkins had suffered a direct harm, he still did not meet the
aggrieved person standard because his interest was not protected or
regulated by the bankruptcy code. 127 The interest he sought to
protect-the litigation bar date defense-originated in the reorganization

117. Id. at 1324.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1325 (quoting Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n v. Barbee (In re Westwood Cmty.
Two Ass'n), 293 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120. Id. (quoting In re Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n, 293 F.3d at 1336) (alteration in

original).
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. (quoting In re Westwood Cmty. Two Ass'n, 293 F.3d at 1358).
Id. at 1325-26.
Id. at 1326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1327.
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Thus, Atkins did not meet the

CONSUMER ISSUES

Lien Stripping

1. Chapter 20. In prior years this Article has discussed a debtor's
ability to "strip off' a wholly unsecured lien in the context of a Chapter
20 case, 3 ' and noted that bankruptcy courts in the Eleventh Circuit
were split over whether the Bankruptcy Code permits such action.'
During the survey period, the Eleventh Circuit decided the case of Wells
FargoBank v. Scantling (In re Scantling),3 2 where the court held that
a Chapter 13 debtor, who is statutorily ineligible for a discharge, may
nevertheless strip off a wholly unsecured lien on his principal residence.'3 3 In doing so, the court put to rest the issue of whether lien
stripping is possible in a Chapter 20 case.
The facts of In re Scantling were straightforward. The debtor filed a
Chapter 13 case within one year of receiving a Chapter 7 discharge. As
part of the Chapter 13 case, the debtor sought to strip off Wells Fargo's
second and third liens on her residence. The bankruptcy court accepted
the valuation of $118,000 for the residence. This amount was less than
the amount of the first lien, which was also held by Wells Fargo. Thus,
34
Wells Fargo was wholly unsecured as to the second and third liens.
The bankruptcy court concluded that under 11 U.S.C. § 50611 the
The Eleventh Circuit
debtor could strip off the junior liens. 3
3
the junior liens were
that
because
reasoned
'
The
court
agreed.
under
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b),"
be
modified
wholly unsecured, they could
thereby allowing a bankruptcy court to strip off the liens.'39 In its
opinion, the Eleventh Circuit noted that prior to the Bankruptcy Abuse

128.
129.
130.
131.
Survey,
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
A Chapter 13 case filed soon after receiving a Chapter 7 discharge.
James D. Walker, Jr., Amber Nickell & Tim Colletti, Bankruptcy,Eleventh Circuit
64 MERCER L. REV. 849, 863 (2013).
754 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 1325.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 506 (2012).
In re Scantling, 754 F.3d at 1325.
Id. at 1330.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2012).
In re Scantling, 754 F.3d at 1329-30.
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Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA),' 4' a
debtor in a so called Chapter 20 was eligible for a discharge and was
typically able to strip off a valueless lien."" The court explained that
lien stripping is a two-step process.14 2 First, the property is valued
pursuant to § 506(a).' 43 Then, if the property is valueless, the creditor's rights may be modified pursuant to § 1322(bX2). T' However, the
court stated that the above approach was "not without limitations," and
went on to examine the Supreme Court's decision in Nobleman v.
American Savings Bank, 45 which held that a Chapter 13 debtor could
not strip off a mortgage lien14 6on a residence where there was at least
some equity in the property.
Next, the court turned to Congress's enactment of the BAPCPA and
analyzed the interplay between § 506 and § 1322(b), following the
enactment of the BAPCPA.'4 7 Under the BAPCPA a debtor who files
a Chapter 13 case within two years of receiving a Chapter 7 discharge
is not eligible for a discharge in her Chapter 13 case.'" Wells Fargo
argued the language of § 1325(aX5), which provides that a holder of a
secured claim retains the lien until either the debt is paid in full or the
debtor receives a discharge, requires lien stripping to be premised upon
a debtor's discharge.'4 9 The court did not agree. 50 The court reasoned that nothing in the BAPCPA amended § 506 or § 1322(b)(2), and
therefore "the analysis permitting lien-stripping in Chapter 20 cases is
no different than that in any other Chapter 13 case."' 5' Accordingly,
§ 1325(a)(5) is not involved, and the debtor's eligibility for a discharge
is irrelevant to a strip off in a Chapter 20 case.'5 2 The court found
that its ruling was in line with the majority of courts to consider the
issue, including the Fourth Circuit, and Tanner v. First Plus Financial,
Inc. (In re Tanner);"3 a previous Eleventh Circuit decision.'

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
In re Scantling, 754 F.3d at 1326.
Id.
Id.
Id.
508 U.S. 324 (1993).
In re Scantling, 754 F.3d at 1326-27.
Id. at 1327-28.
Id.
Id. at 1328.
Id. at 1330.

151. Id. at 1329 (quoting Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis), 716 F.3d 331, 338 (4th Cir.

2013)).
152. Id. at 1329-30.
153. Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2000).
154. In re Scantling, 754 F.3d at 1328-29.
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2. Abandoned Property. Does a bankruptcy court have authority
to strip off a wholly unsecured lien even if the trustee has abandoned
the property to which the lien attaches? In the Southern District of
Florida the answer may depend on the judge. In La Paz at Boca Pointe
Phase II Condominium Ass'n v. Bandy, 5 the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that abandonment removes property,
for the purposes of lien stripping, from the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court."5 6 Therefore, a bankruptcy court lacks the authority to strip off
an unsecured lien once the property is abandoned.'57 In doing so, the
court reversed a bankruptcy court decision, which allowed the debtor to
strip off a wholly unsecured junior lien even though the Chapter 7
However, in In re Bodentrustee had abandoned the property.'
siek,'59 which was decided after Bandy, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that a court "may grant a motion to
value and strip liens under section 506 without regard to whether the
collateral was, or might be, abandoned by the estate."' 60
Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows for the bifurcation of
claims when the value of the property subject to a lien is less than the
value of the claim. 6 ' After bifurcation, a claim is secured to the
extent of the value of the collateral (or equity), and is unsecured for any
amount remaining.'6 2 The argument against permitting lien stripping
on abandoned property focuses on the language of§ 506(a), which allows
bifurcation only where collateral is "property in which the estate has an
interest."163 Thus, the argument goes, there can be no bifurcation
under § 506(a) because the bankruptcy estate retains no interest in
abandoned property. 6 1 In Bandy, the court relied heavily on In re
Dewsnup,"6' a Tenth Circuit decision.166 In that case the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that the issue was simply a matter of statutory
construction, ruling that "abandoned property is not property in which

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

523 B.R. 267 (S.D. Fla. 2014).
Id. at 272.
Id.
Id. at 268 (discussing the holding of the bankruptcy court).
522 B.R. 737 (S.D. Fla. 2015).
Id. at 741.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
In re Bodensiek, 522 B.R. at 738.
11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
Bandy, 523 B.R. at 271.
908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
Bandy, 523 B.R. at 270-71.
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the estate has an interest," and therefore "section 506(a) does not
apply.""' 7 The ruling in In re Dewsnup was affirmed by the United
However, the Supreme Court did not
States Supreme Court.'68
Instead, the Supreme Court's
address the jurisdictional issue.16
decision focused on another issue and ultimately held that the "strip
down" of a lien was impermissible."' The court in Bandy agreed with
the Tenth Circuit, and found that its rationale was bolstered by the
Supreme Court's affirmance of In re Dewsnup in Dewsnup v. Timm,"'
notwithstanding that the Supreme Court did not address the jurisdictional issue in its decision. 72 It also found that the Eleventh Circuit's
holding in In re McNeal was not applicable because in that case the
and it did not address jurisdiction
court did not address abandonment,
173
in the context of abandonment.

Unlike the district court in Bandy, the bankruptcy court in In re
Bodensiek disagreed with the Tenth Circuit's decision in In re Dewsnup.174 Rather, it interpreted § 506(a) to be effective as of "the petition
date and not some later date when the court considers a motion to value"
the collateral.'7 5 Under this reading of the statute, because the estate
has an interest in the property on the petition date, the unsecured junior
lien can be stripped off regardless of whether the property is later
abandoned. 176 This interpretation is in line with Gaglia v. First
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n," 7 a Third Circuit decision.7 8 In
Circuit explicitly
Gaglia,which was decided prior to Dewsnup, the Third
179
permitted lien stripping on abandoned property.

167. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 591.
168. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992).
169. Id. at 416-17.
170. Id. at 417.
171. Id. at 410.
172. Bandy, 523 B.R. at 272 (stating that even though the Supreme Court did not
address the jurisdictional issue, it affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision "which was
partially premised upon jurisdictional grounds").
173. Id. at 272.
174. In re Bodensiek, 522 B.R. at 739, 740. It is worth mentioning that, while a district
court decision can be persuasive, it is not binding on a bankruptcy court if there is more
than one district judge within the district. See In re Barakat, 173 B.R. 672, 678 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (discussing the doctrine of stare decisis and explaining that "in a district with more
than one district judge, the appellate ruling by a district judge is only binding on the case
in which it is made and not on the district as a whole unless the district judges themselves
sit en banc and therefore bind themselves to the law enunciated in that opinion").
175. In re Bodensiek, 522 B.R. at 740.
176. Id. at 740-41.
177. 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989).
178. Id. at 1307.
179. See id.
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Moreover, the court's decision in In re Bodensiek is supported by
Justice Scalia's dissent in Dewsup, where he specifically addressed the
jurisdictional issue of whether § 506 applies to abandoned property.'s
The court in In re Bodensiek quoted Justice Scalia when he explained
that
The fallacy in this is the assumption that the application of § 506(a)
(and hence § 506(d)) can be undone if and when the estate ceases to
"have an interest" in property in which it "had an interest" at the
outset of the bankruptcy proceeding. The text does not read that way.
Section 506 automatically operates upon all property in which the
estate has an interest at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed.
Once § 506(a)'s grant of [secured-creditor] rights, and § 506(d)'s
elimination of the right to "underwater" liens and liens securing
unallowed claims have occurred, they cannot be undone by later
abandonment of the property.18'
In a further deviation from the district court's decision in Bandy, the
bankruptcy court found that McNeal was applicable in abandoned
82
property cases, and therefore lien stripping was permissible."

B.

Claims

In the case of Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, s3 the Eleventh
Circuit was presented with the issue of whether the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act (FDCPA)' is violated when filing a proof of claim for a
debt that is unenforceable due to the expiration of the applicable statute
of limitations." 8 The court answered the question in the affirmative. 86
' LVNV Funding has now filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court. s7 Similar claims are pending in our court, so
no further comment can be made at this time.

180.
181.
182.
183.

Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 431.
522 B.R. at 739 (quoting Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 431).
Id. at 741.
758 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2014).

184. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012).

185. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1256-57.
186. Id. at 1257.
187. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES, www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx

?filename=/docketfiles/14-858.htm (last visited May 12,2015) (noting the petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed January 2015)).
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AVOIDANCE

According to 11 U.S.C. § 548(aX1),'" a trustee can avoid any
transfers made within two years of the bankruptcy filing if the trustee
can show that the debtor received less than the reasonable equivalent
value for the transfer and was insolvent at the time of the transfer.189
11 U.S.C. § 550(aXl)' 9 allows a trustee to then recover the value of
any transfer voided under § 548 from the initial transferee of such
Read literally, § 550 allows the trustee to recover the
transfer.'
value of the property avoided under § 548 from the first person to
receive it, regardless of the circumstances.' 92 However, there are
exceptions to a trustee's ability to recover from a transferee that would
of§ 550(aX1)-one such exception is the
otherwise meet the requirements
193
"mere conduit" exception.

In the case of Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors,
LLC) 94 a bankruptcy trustee sought to recover estimated income tax
payments by the debtor to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on behalf
of its principal. The IRS argued, among other things, that it qualified
as a mere conduit and therefore was not an initial transferee under
§ 550.195

In 2006, Brian Denson formed Custom Contracting, LLC, as a singlemember limited liability company and structured it as a S corporation.
As a S corporation, the company did not pay corporate, income tax.
Instead, profits earned by the corporation were "passed through" to
Denson, who then paid taxes on the income earned by the company. In
2007 and 2008, Custom Contracting, LLC paid Denson's estimated tax
payments and listed the payments as a distribution to Denson.
However, Custom Contracting, LLC operated at a loss in 2008, meaning
Denson had no tax liability for that year and entitling him to a refund
of the estimated tax payments. The IRS refunded the payment to
Denson, but he never returned the money to Custom Contracting,
LLC. 96

188. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012).
189. Id.
190. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)(1) (2012).

191. Id.
192. See id.
193. See Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 745 F.3d 1342,
1349 (11th Cir. 2014).
194. 745 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 2014).
195. Id. at 1344, 1349.
196. Id. at 1345.
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In 2009, Custom Contracting, LLC filed a Chapter 7 petition in the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida,
and the trustee brought an adversary proceeding against the IRS
seeking to recover eight payments from Custom Contracting, LLC to the
IRS, including the 2008 payments. The bankruptcy court agreed with
the trustee and found that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the
2008 payment and that the IRS qualified as an initial transferee under
§ 550(aXl). The district court reversed the ruling, finding the IRS was
simply acting as an intermediary, and was thus not an initial transferee." 7 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court and held that, under the circumstances of the 2008
transfer, the IRS fell under the mere conduit exception and therefore did
not qualify as an initial transferee. 98
To meet the mere conduit exception a defendant must show "(1) that
they did not have control over the assets received, i.e., that they merely
served as a conduit for the assets that were under the actual control of
the debtor-transferor and (2) that they acted in good faith and as an
innocent participant in the fraudulent transfer."' 99 In In re Custom
Contractors,the parties agreed that the good faith prong of the test had
question for the court was whether the IRS satisfied
been met. Thus, the
20 0
the control prong.
In the Eleventh Circuit, the extent of the transferee's control over the
transferred property is crucial in determining whether recovery is
permitted under § 550.201 The court is to view the transaction as a
whole and "consider both the initial recipient's legal rights to the funds
at issue as well as any existing obligations." 2 2 For example, where a
bank receives deposits, courts have held that the bank does not qualify
as an initial transferee because even though the bank may use the funds
for loans, its "obligations owed to the transferor-namely to return the
funds upon request-are sufficiently important" that courts do not hold
the bank liable as an initial transferee in spite of significant control of
the funds.20 3
In this particular case, the court concluded that the IRS qualified as
a conduit for the refunded tax payments.2 ° ' In doing so, the court

197. Id. at 1345-46.
198. Id. at 1352, 1353.
199. Id. at 1349-50 (quoting Martinez v. Hutton (In re Harwell), 628 F.3d 1312, 1323
(2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
200. Id. at 1350.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203.

Id.

204. Id. at 1352.
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compared the IRS's role in the transfer to that of a bank receiving
deposits.2"5 The court reasoned that because Denson never actually
owed taxes for 2008, the IRS held the payments "subject to the looming
°8
possibility" that it would be required to refund the funds to Denson.
Thus, the IRS's contingent obligation to refund the payments to Denson
was essentially the same as a bank's obligation to return a depositors
funds.2" 7
The trustee also argued that she could avoid the transfers under
§ 544(b)(1) because the transfers were voidable under state law.208 To
counter, the IRS argued that the trustee's claim did not fall within the
scope of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), 2 9 which provides waiver of sovereign
immunity.210 According to the IRS, the trustee could not satisfy the
actual creditor requirement of § 544(bX1) because sovereign immunity
would bar any creditors from suing the IRS in state court. 21 ' The
court declined to rule on this issue because it found the debtor was not
insolvent prior to 2008, and thus, the transfers were not avoidable under
state law.212 However, the court did note that courts were split on that
particular issue, with several bankruptcy courts holding that § 106(a)'s
abrogation of sovereign immunity allows the trustee to proceed with a
§ 544(b)(1) claim without showing the existence of an actual creditor who
could avoid the transfer under state law. 213 On the other hand, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "§ 106(a)(1) does not
displace the actual-creditor requirement in § 544(bX 1).,214
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Issues relevant to consumer debtors were the most noticeable trend
among this year's cases, and it is difficult to say what 2015 will bring.

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 1352-53.
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id. at 1346-47.
11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2012).
In re Custom Contractors,LLC, 745 F.3d at 1347.

211. Id.
212. Id. at 1348.
213. See, e.g., VMI Liquidating Trust Dated December 16, 2011 v. United States (In re
Valley Mortg., Inc.), No. 10-19101-SBB, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4025, at *12 (D. Colo. Sept.

18, 2013); Zazzali v. Swenson (In re DBSI, Inc.), No. 08-12687(PJW), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS
791, at *11-12 (D. Del. Feb. 11, 2011); Furr v. United States Dep't of Treasury (In re
Pharmacy Distrib. Servs., Inc.), 455 B.R. 817, 820-21 (S.D. Fla. (2011); Tolz v. United

States (In re Brandon Overseas, Inc.), No. 08-11035-BKC-RBR, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS 2326,
at *9-10 (S.D. Fla. July 16, 2010); Liebersohn v. IRS (In re C.F. Foods, L.P.), 265 B.R. 71,
85-86 (E.D. Pa. (2001).
214.

In re Equip. Acquisition Res., Inc., 742 F.3d 743, 744 (7th Cir. 2014).
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But, looking forward, 2015 promises to be another exciting year for
bankruptcy developments.

